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INTERESTS OF THE AMICI CURIAE1 
Amici Curiae include AARP and tenant organizations rep-
resenting many thousands of public housing residents in most 
jurisdictions throughout the nation.  Their members, and the 
communities in which they reside, are directly affected by the 
eviction policies at issue here. 
Amicus AARP is a nonprofit membership organization of 
35 million persons age fifty and older dedicated to addressing 
the needs and interests of older Americans.  Over 1.7 million 
households, headed by a person 62 years of age and older, 
live in federally subsidized rental housing.  AARP’s interest 
in housing extends to the rights of those older residents, in-
cluding those who are raising their grandchildren, some of 
whom reside in public housing covered by the eviction poli-
cies at issue in this case. 
Additional Amici are tenant organizations representing 
public housing residents in communities around the nation.  
Each of these tenant organizations has an interest in ensuring 
that this Court maintain and enforce clear and long-standing 
congressional policies that protect innocent, law-abiding ten-
ants from unjust evictions. 
Amicus ENPHRONT—Everywhere and Now Public 
Housing Residents Organizing Nationally Together—is a 
resident-led organization with members and affiliates in 46 
states, in addition to Puerto Rico and the District of Colum-
bia, that advocates for the preservation, improvement and 
development of public housing through coordinated local and 
                                                 
1 Amici Curiae have obtained the written consent of Petitioners United 
States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Oakland 
Housing Authority (OHA), and Harold Davis, as well as the written con-
sent of Respondents Pearlie Rucker, et al. to file this brief with the Court. 
Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37(6), Amici Curiae note that counsel 
for Amici wrote the entirety of this brief and that no person or entity, 
other than the Amici Curiae, their members, or their counsel, made a 
monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief. 
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national action.  The organization also works to educate resi-
dents about the laws and policies affecting their lives, includ-
ing those governing evictions. 
Amicus Massachusetts Union of Public Housing Tenants 
(Mass Union), a membership organization including individ-
ual residents and local tenant organizations, represents thou-
sands of tenants statewide.  It seeks to advance safe and se-
cure public housing through responsible behavior by both 
tenants and housing authorities.  Mass Union believes that 
while housing authorities should act vigilantly to protect 
families from crime and violence through eviction of tenants 
that do not live responsibly, residents should not have to fear 
that their entire families will become homeless as the result 
of one bad act which the head of household had no reason to 
anticipate, and innocent tenants should keep their homes if 
they take reasonable steps to exclude wrongdoers. 
Amicus Island Tenants on the Rise is a Hawai’i statewide 
nonprofit organization of elected public housing tenants from 
five islands.  Formed in 1996, it represents the interests of 
over 2000 families.  It provides training and counseling to 
residents with respect to evictions and issues related to crime, 
security, and maintenance in their homes, and advocates for 
its members with respect to the policies of the state housing 
authority. 
Amicus Public Housing Resident Council (PHRC) is the 
city-wide organization of all public housing tenant leaders in 
Kansas City, Missouri.  Its membership consists of 55 elected 
officers of the various public housing developments, repre-
senting over 1,800 public housing families and households.  
Established in 1994, it is recognized by the Housing Author-
ity of Kansas City (HAKC) as the Resident Advisory Board 
and as the city-wide organization of resident leaders.  The 
PHRC negotiated a lease with the HAKC, which includes 
protection for innocent tenants, which, in conjunction with 
other crime and security measures, has proven effective in 
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reducing crime in HAKC public housing communities, while 
protecting tenants against arbitrary loss of their homes. 
Amicus Carmelitos Tenants Association, in existence for 
more than 25 years and incorporated in 1994, is the recog-
nized representative of the more than 500 residents of the 
Carmelitos housing development in Long Beach, California.  
It publishes a monthly newsletter to inform and educate its 
members, has negotiated and commented on revisions to 
leases, represents tenants in grievances, and counsels tenants 
on eviction-related issues. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Section 1437d(l)(6) of the United States Housing Act pro-
vides that Public Housing Authorities (PHAs) that receive 
federal assistance shall use leases that “provide that any . . . 
drug-related criminal activity on or off [public housing] 
premises, engaged in by a public housing tenant, any member 
of the tenant’s household, or any guest or other person under 
the tenant’s control, shall be cause for termination of ten-
ancy.”  42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) (Supp. V 1999). 
HUD has interpreted this section to require PHAs to use 
leases that contain provisions obligating a public housing 
tenant  
[t]o assure that the tenant, any member of the 
household, a guest, or another person under the 
tenant’s control, shall not engage in . . . [a]ny 
drug-related criminal activity on or near [public 
housing] premises.  Any criminal activity in vio-
lation of the preceding sentence shall be cause for 
termination of tenancy, and for eviction from the 
unit. 
24 C.F.R. § 966.4(f)(12)(i)(B) (2000).  In promulgating this 
regulation, HUD explained that it understood section 
1437d(l)(6) as requiring that PHAs use leases imposing upon 
public housing tenants the obligation to warrant against illicit 
drug activity. Public Housing Lease and Grievance Proce-
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dures, 56 Fed. Reg. 51,560, 51,567 (Oct. 11, 1991) (“The 
tenant should not be excused from contractual responsibility 
by arguing that the tenant did not know, could not foresee, or 
could not control behavior by other occupants of the unit.”). 
While Amici fully support Respondents’ argument that 
Congress intended to create, as a matter of federal law, an 
innocent tenant2 defense to eviction under the lease provision 
required by section 1437d(l)(6), Amici here argue in the al-
ternative that the text of section 1437d(l)(6) is silent as to the 
existence of affirmative defenses and that HUD’s interpreta-
tion of the section, precluding an innocent-tenant defense, is 
an unreasonable construction of the statute.  See Chevron 
U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 
843 (1984) (“[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with re-
spect to the specific issue, the question for the court is 
whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible con-
struction of the statute.”); id. at 844 (noting that where a “leg-
islative delegation to an agency on a particular question is 
implicit rather than explicit” the question for the court is 
whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable).3 
                                                 
2 Throughout this brief, Amici will use the term “innocent tenant” to 
mean a public housing tenant who did not know, and had no reason to 
know, of the drug-related criminal activity that is the basis for a PHA’s 
eviction action against the tenant. 
3 Petitioners OHA and Davis imply that HUD interpreted section 
1437d(l)(6) pursuant to express congressional delegation and that, there-
fore, HUD’s regulations should be given “‘controlling weight unless they 
are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.’” OHA 
Brief 26 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44).  OHA’s implication is 
mistaken:  Congress did not expressly delegate authority to HUD to 
promulgate legislative regulations to give effect to section 1437d(l)(6).  
Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(q)(5) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (“The Secretary 
shall, by regulation, establish procedures necessary to ensure that infor-
mation provided under this subsection to a public housing agency is used. 
. . as required under this subsection.”).  HUD’s authority to interpret sec-
tion 1437d(l)(6) arises under Congress’ grant of general rule-making 
power, as HUD itself notes.  See 24 C.F.R. pt. 966 (2000) (citing 42 
U.S.C. § 3535(d) (1994)).  Thus the inquiry for the Court is whether 
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Section 1437d(l)(6) indisputably requires PHAs to use 
leases that create a cause for termination of tenancy.  But un-
der basic principles of landlord-tenant law, the existence of a 
cause for termination is not incompatible with the existence 
of affirmative defenses to eviction.  Federally assisted public 
housing is an amalgam of state and federal law, and the exis-
tence of federal protections against eviction do not preempt 
protections available under state law, as HUD has  expressly 
acknowledged.  Public Housing Lease and Grievance Proce-
dures, 56 Fed. Reg. 51,560, 51,565 (Oct. 11, 1991).  The text 
of section 1437d(l)(6) is silent as to the existence of any af-
firmative defenses.  Congress enacted section 1437d(l)(6) 
against a backdrop of landlord-tenant law under which af-
firmative defenses may be asserted in response to a cause for 
termination.  Thus, the text’s silence regarding affirmative 
defenses cannot be taken as an indication of congressional 
intent to preclude an innocent-tenant defense. 
HUD’s interpretation of Congress’ silence is unreason-
able. 
1. HUD has previously tried to curtail tenants’ rights to 
present legal and equitable defenses to eviction.  When it did 
so, Congress interceded and asked HUD to reconsider.  Peti-
tioners argue that because there is no express language in 
section 1437d(l)(6) creating an innocent-tenant defense, the 
Court should conclude that Congress did not intend to permit 
one.  In light of this history, however, the opposite presump-
tion should hold.  Absent clear statutory language that elimi-
nates defenses, the Court should conclude that section 
1437d(l)(6) leaves in place any affirmative defenses to evic-
tion that exist under state or federal law. 
2. Congress requires PHAs to use leases that do not con-
tain any unreasonable terms or conditions.  42 U.S.C.  
                                                                                                    
HUD’s regulations implementing section 1437d(l)(6) are reasonable. 
United States v. Mead Corp., 121 S.Ct. 2164, 2172 (2001); Chevron, 467 
U.S. at 844. 
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§ 1437d(l)(2) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  HUD argues that this 
requirement has no bearing on the proper interpretation of 
section 1437d(l)(6) because, by enacting the section, Con-
gress has decided that the exclusion of an innocent-tenant 
defense is reasonable.  But this argument begs the question, 
for it assumes that the section precludes an innocent-tenant 
defense.  The proper question is whether Congress’ prohibi-
tion against unreasonable terms suggests anything about 
whether, in enacting section 1437d(l)(6), Congress intended 
to prohibit the innocent-tenant defense.  If there are reasons 
for believing that the exclusion of such a defense would be 
unreasonable, then the prohibition against unreasonable terms 
suggests that section 1437d(l)(6) should not be interpreted as 
prohibiting the defense. 
There are at least two reasons for believing that the exclu-
sion of an innocent-tenant defense would be unreasonable.  
The first is that it undermines the central policy goal it pur-
ports to further.  HUD argues that strict liability gives public 
housing tenants an incentive to determine whether their 
household members or guests are engaging in drug-related 
activity and to prevent such activity from occurring.  How-
ever, the preclusion of an innocent tenant defense almost en-
sures that tenants will not seek the assistance of public hous-
ing authorities or the police to address the illicit behavior be-
cause such a request could easily result in the tenant’s evic-
tion. 
Second, the preclusion of an innocent tenant defense is in-
consistent with Congress’ endorsement of the good cause 
eviction requirement in public housing.  The good cause re-
quirement was first recognized by the courts in the 1950s, 
was developed by HUD in the 1960s and 1970s, and was en-
dorsed by Congress and made part of the Housing Act in 
1983.  Underlying the good cause requirement is the idea 
that, because of the importance of the benefit involved, a 
public housing tenant should not be deprived of his or her 
home in the absence of serious misconduct for which the ten-
 
 
8 
 
ant can fairly be held responsible.  Permitting the eviction of 
innocent tenants is inconsistent with this long-standing prin-
ciple and so is unreasonable. 
3. There is little extant legislative history that is relevant 
to the question of an innocent tenant defense.  Most of the 
history on which Petitioners and their Amici Curiae rely does 
not speak to the issue of whether a tenant, faced with possible 
eviction for alleged breach of the lease provision mandated 
by section 1437d(l)(6), may assert any affirmative defenses.  
The one piece of legislative history that directly bears on the 
questions presented supports the conclusion that, in enacting 
section 1437d(l)(6), Congress not only did not intend to pre-
clude affirmative defenses but intended to protect innocent 
tenants.  The Senate committee report accompanying legisla-
tion amending section 1437d(l)(6) states that the section does 
not create good cause to evict innocent family members.  The 
report also explicitly states that eviction courts are to exercise 
discretion in considering whether to evict under the required 
lease provision.  This is weighty evidence that Congress be-
lieved that a tenant could present affirmative defenses, in-
cluding innocence, to the eviction court.  If the section pre-
cluded defenses, the only issue for the eviction court to de-
cide would be the existence of a cause for termination, and 
the court would have no occasion to exercise its discretion. 
4. When a statute is silent about some issue, deference to 
agency regulations is appropriate when the agency’s regula-
tions apply the statute’s general policies to specific circum-
stances that Congress may not have considered.  This is not a 
case in which Congress expected HUD to fill a statutory gap.  
A public housing tenancy is an amalgam of federal and state 
law.  The distinction between causes for eviction and af-
firmative defenses is basic to state landlord-tenant law.  
Moreover, public housing tenants routinely assert state-law 
defenses in eviction proceedings.  In enacting section 
1437d(l)(6), Congress was well aware of the hybrid nature of 
the public housing leasehold interest and the use of state-law 
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defenses to eviction.  Through section 1437d(l)(6), Congress 
required PHAs to use leases that create a specific cause for 
termination.  The availability of affirmative defenses to evic-
tion is a central element of the public housing tenancy.  Had 
Congress intended to eliminate affirmative defenses, one 
would expect Congress to have done so explicitly.  Congress’ 
silence on the availability of affirmative defenses is an indi-
cation of its intent not to disrupt the status quo. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TEXT OF SECTION 1437d(l)(6) IS SILENT AS TO 
THE EXISTENCE OF AN INNOCENT TENANT DE-
FENSE; HUD’S INTERPRETATION OF THE SEC-
TION IS UNREASONABLE AND THEREFORE IN-
VALID 
I. THE TEXT OF SECTION 1437d(l)(6) IS SILENT 
AS TO THE EXISTENCE OF AN INNOCENT 
TENANT DEFENSE 
Under Petitioners’ interpretation of the plain language of 
section 1437d(l)(6), Congress requires PHAs to use leases 
that permit them to terminate the tenancy of a public housing 
tenant and evict the tenant if a member of the tenant’s house-
hold, a guest, or other person under the tenant’s control en-
gages in specified drug-related activity, regardless of whether 
the tenant knew, or had reason to know, about the drug-
related activity.  See, e.g., Brief for the United States De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD Brief) 
14, 18; Brief for Petitioners Oakland Housing Authority and 
Harold Davis (OHA Brief) 17–18, 28. 
Petitioners primarily base their interpretation on two 
premises.  The first is what HUD describes as the “expan-
sive” language used in section 1437d(l)(6):  The provision 
makes “any” drug-related criminal activity a ground for ter-
mination.  HUD Brief 20; see also id. at 23; OHA Brief 27.  
The second is that the section contains no express language 
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limiting the required lease provision to drug-related activity 
of which the tenant was, or should have been, aware.  HUD 
Brief 19; OHA Brief 29. From these premises, Petitioners 
conclude that Congress intended to permit PHAs to hold ten-
ants strictly liable for the conduct of their household mem-
bers, guests, and others over whom they have control.  HUD 
Brief 20; OHA Brief 29. 
As Amici will demonstrate, Petitioners’ conclusion is 
simply a non sequitur.  From the fact that the section unam-
biguously requires PHAs to use leases that create an unquali-
fied cause for termination, it does not follow that the section 
prohibits affirmative defenses to the cause.  The section is 
silent as to the existence of such defenses. 
As HUD correctly notes, “‘[t]he plainness or ambiguity of 
statutory language is determined by reference to the language 
itself, the specific context in which the language is used, and 
the broader context of the statute as a whole.’”  HUD Brief 
18 (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 
(1997)).  HUD concedes that section 1437d(l)(6) “does not 
expressly address the tenant’s level of personal knowledge, in 
the sense that it does not expressly condition eviction on any 
state of personal knowledge.”  Id. at 23.  HUD nonetheless 
concludes that the section’s use of “any” and the absence of 
express defenses precludes an innocent-tenant defense. 
HUD’s argument ignores “the specific context in which 
the language is used, and the broader context of the statute as 
a whole.”  Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341.  When basic elements 
of typical state landlord-tenant law are considered—elements 
upon which Congress has relied since it created federally-
assisted public housing in 19374—it becomes apparent that 
the fact that section 1437d(l)(6) provides a ground for termi-
                                                 
4 The 1937 act recognized state “civil and criminal jurisdiction in and 
over” federally owned public housing projects and explicitly preserved 
“the civil rights under the State or local law of the inhabitants on such 
property.”  United States Housing Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-412,  
§ 13(b), 50 Stat. 888, 895. 
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nation does not preclude the existence of affirmative defenses 
to that ground. 
HUD has long recognized that a public housing tenancy is 
defined, in part, by state landlord-tenant law.  See, e.g., Ten-
ancy and Administrative Grievance Procedure for Public 
Housing, 53 Fed. Reg. 33,216, 33,257 (Aug. 30, 1988) 
(“[T]he procedural and substantive law affecting a tenancy in 
the public housing program is compounded of elements es-
tablished by both Federal and State law.”).  In announcing its 
final rule concerning eviction for drug-related activity fol-
lowing the passage of the Cranston-Gonzales National Af-
fordable Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 101-625, 104 Stat. 4079 
(1990), HUD emphasized that a public housing tenancy 
should be understood as a creature of “normal landlord-
tenant law.”  Public Housing Lease and Grievance Proce-
dures, 56 Fed. Reg. at 51,567. 
It is a basic principle of “normal landlord-tenant law” that 
the existence of a statutory or contractual cause for termina-
tion of a tenancy is not incompatible with the existence of 
affirmative defenses to termination on that ground.  Thus, for 
example, in most if not all states, nonpayment of rent is a 
ground for eviction.5  However, in most states, a tenant may 
raise the landlord’s breach of the implied warranty of habita-
bility as an affirmative defense to eviction for nonpayment of 
rent.6  The defense is available notwithstanding the fact that 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1161(2) (West 1982 & Supp. 2001); 
Or. Rev. Stat. § 105.115 (1999); Tex. Prop. Code Ann. ch. 24 (Vernon 
2000). 
6 By 1979, the doctrine of implied warranty of habitability had obtained 
majority status in the United States, having been adopted by 41 states and 
the District of Columbia.  See Pugh v. Holmes, 405 A.2d 897, 902 & n.2 
(Pa. 1979) (collecting cases and statutes).  Most courts to have considered 
the issue have held that breach of the implied warranty of habitability is 
an affirmative defense to eviction for nonpayment of rent.  See Robert S. 
Schoshinski, American Law of Landlord and Tenant § 3:22 n.4 (1980 & 
Supp. 2001) (collecting cases); see also Restatement (Second) of Prop.: 
Landlord and Tenant § 5.1 n.7a (1977 & Supp. 2001) (collecting cases). 
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the statutes making nonpayment of rent a ground for eviction 
typically do not explicitly provide for affirmative defenses.7  
Similarly, many courts have refused to evict when they found 
that the tenants should not be held responsible for the offend-
ing conduct.8  Moreover, many states have recognized an in-
nocent-tenant defense to for-cause evictions.9 
                                                 
7 For a discussion of the common law development of the implied war-
ranty of habitability, see Schoshinski, supra note 6, § 3:16.  Some states 
have created the implied warranty by statute, id. § 3:31, and many have 
recognized assertion of the implied warranty as an affirmative defense to 
eviction, id. § 3:32 n.83. 
8 See, e.g., Brown v. Hous. Opportunities Comm'n, 714 A.2d 197 (Md. 
1998) (upholding authority of trial court to refuse to evict tenant for dem-
onstrated breach of lease involving off-premises fight and drug posses-
sion of household member); Hodess v. Bonefont, 519 N.E.2d 258 (Mass. 
1988) (holding that thefts committed by sons not sufficient reason to evict 
tenant), Investors Diversified Prop. Mgmt., Inc. v. Brown, No. 87-360-II, 
1988 WL 102781 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 1988) (holding that single, un-
foreseeable assault by child on playmate not sufficient for eviction of 
tenant); Moundsville Hous. Auth. v. Porter, 370 S.E.2d 341 (W.Va. 1988) 
(holding that beating of tenant by boyfriend was not sufficient reason to 
evict). 
9 See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 47a-15 (1991); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 121B, 
§ 32 (Supp. 2001); Hous. Auth. of Norwalk v. Harris, 625 A.2d 816 
(Conn. 1993); Williams v. Hawai’i Hous. Auth., 690 P.2d 285 (Haw. Ct. 
App. 1984); Am. Apt. Mgmt. Co. v. Phillips, 653 N.E.2d 834 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1995); Boston Hous. Auth. v. Bell, 697 N.E.2d 130 (Mass. 1998) (reaf-
firming Spence v. Gormley, 439 N.E.2d 741 (Mass. 1982)); Charlotte 
Hous. Auth. v. Patterson, 464 S.E.2d 68 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995); Hous. 
Auth. v. Thomas, 723 A.2d 119 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1999); Allegheny 
County Hous. Auth. v. Hibbler, 748 A.2d 786 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000); 
Memphis Hous. Auth. v. Thompson, 38 S.W.3d 504 (Tenn. 2001), cert. 
denied, 122 S.Ct. 59 (2001), Wessington House Apts. v. Clinard, No. M 
1999-01029-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 605105 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 5, 
2001); cf. 7 C.F.R. pt. 1930, subpt. C, Ex. B ¶ XIV(A)(2)(c) (2000) (Ru-
ral Housing Service (RHS) regulation providing that, for RHS-
administered housing, drug-related grounds for eviction do not extend to 
uninvolved household members, or to cases in which tenant takes reason-
able steps to prevent or control or remove the offender).  For a discussion 
of various states’ experiences with drug-eviction policies and the inno-
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It is indisputable that section 1437d(l)(6) requires PHAs to 
use leases that make the commission of certain criminal and 
drug-related activity a cause for termination of tenancy.  But 
Petitioners are mistaken in arguing that the creation of a 
broad cause for termination and the absence of any express 
language creating an affirmative innocent-tenant defense 
demonstrates that Congress intended to impose a lease provi-
sion requiring the tenant to warrant that no drug-related activ-
ity will occur on or off public housing premises, regardless of 
the tenant’s knowledge.  See HUD Brief 23; OHA Brief 29.  
While section 1437d(l)(6) requires PHAs to use leases that 
contain a certain cause for termination of tenancy, the statute 
is silent as to the existence of any affirmative defenses to that 
cause.10 
                                                                                                    
cent-tenant defense see David B. Bryson & Roberta L. Youmans, Crime, 
Drugs, and Subsidized Housing, 24 Clearinghouse Rev. 435 (1990); Di-
ana A. Johnston, Drugs and Public Housing:  A Connecticut Case Study, 
24 Clearinghouse Rev. 448 (1990). 
10 HUD argues that Congress’ subsequent passage of the Quality Housing 
and Work Responsibility Act of 1998 (Quality Housing Act), Pub. L. No. 
105-276, § 577, 112 Stat. 2639, 2640–41 (codified at 42 U.S.C.  
§ 13662(a) (Supp. V 1999)), provides additional evidence that, in enact-
ing section 1437d(l)(6), Congress intended to preclude an innocent tenant 
defense.  See HUD Brief 21 n.7, 42 n.16.  That section of the Quality 
Housing Act requires PHAs or owners of federally assisted housing to 
establish standards or use leases with provisions that “allow the agency or 
owner . . . to terminate the tenancy or assistance for any household with a 
member . . . who the public housing agency or owner determines is ille-
gally using a controlled substance.”  42 U.S.C. § 13662(a).  However the 
Quality Housing Act provision provides no support for HUD’s position.  
Like section 1437d(l)(6), section 13662(a) creates a cause for termination 
without explicitly creating or prohibiting affirmative defenses to the 
cause.  As demonstrated in the text, under typical landlord-tenant law, the 
existence of a cause for termination of tenancy is not in itself evidence of 
the absence of any affirmative defenses to termination on that ground. 
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II. HUD’S CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 1437d(l)(6) 
IS UNREASONABLE 
A. HUD previously attempted to eliminate public 
housing tenants’ legal and equitable defenses to 
eviction and was rebuffed by Congress; the Court 
should not assume that Congress has implicitly 
eliminated a defense to eviction 
Generally, when a PHA decides to terminate a tenant’s 
lease, the tenant first has a right to contest the PHA’s deci-
sion at an administrative grievance proceeding before defend-
ing against the eviction in court.  42 U.S.C. § 1437d(k) (1994 
& Supp. V 1999) (directing HUD to promulgate regulations 
that require PHAs to provide administrative grievance proce-
dures through which a tenant affected by an adverse PHA 
action may contest the PHA’s determination that such action 
is merited); see 24 C.F.R. §§ 966.51(a)(1), 966.53(a) (2000) 
(implementing section 1437d(k)).  If the eviction is based on 
the occurrence of drug-related criminal activity, Congress 
permits PHAs to bypass grievance proceedings so long as the 
state in which the PHA is located requires a judicial hearing 
prior to eviction and such court hearings “provide the basic 
elements of due process.”  42 U.S.C. § 1437d(k); see 24 
C.F.R. § 966.51(a)(2) (2000). 
Congress requires HUD to make the determination 
whether state-court eviction proceedings satisfy due process.  
42 U.S.C. § 1437d(k).  Since 1975, HUD has defined the 
“elements of due process” to include the “[o]pportunity for 
the tenant . . . to present any affirmative legal or equitable 
defense which the tenant may have.”  24 C.F.R.  
§ 966.53(c)(3) (2000); see Public Housing Lease and Griev-
ance Procedures, 40 Fed. Reg. 33,402, 33,407 (Aug. 7, 
1975). 
In 1988, HUD published a final rule which would have 
eliminated, among other things, the opportunity to present 
legal and equitable defenses as an element of due process. 
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Tenancy and Administrative Grievance Procedure for Public 
Housing, 53 Fed. Reg. at 33,290–33,293, 33,304 (announc-
ing, inter alia, adoption of proposed 24 C.F.R. § 966.2).  
Shortly thereafter, a congressional conference committee re-
port on legislation to amend the McKinney Act specifically 
questioned the adequacy of the criteria HUD planned to use 
in making its due process determinations. H.R. Conf. Rep. 
No. 100-1089, at 102 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
4395, 4486.  When it enacted the legislation recommended 
by the conference report, Congress directed HUD to treat the 
regulations announced in its final rule as having only interim 
effect and to entertain additional public comments on the 
rules.  Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Amend-
ment Acts of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-628, § 1013, 102 Stat. 
3224, 3269 (1988).  Subsequently, a federal court enjoined 
implementation of the regulations, Nat’l Tenants Org. v. 
Pierce, No. 88-3134, 1989 U.S. Dist. Lexis 18348, *9 
(D.D.C. Jan. 25, 1989), and HUD withdrew the proposed 
regulations, reinstating the prior regulations, which contained 
the right to present legal and equitable defenses as an element 
of due process, Tenancy and Administrative Grievance Pro-
cedure for Public Housing, 54 Fed. Reg. 6,886 (Feb. 15, 
1989). 
When it next proposed changes to public housing griev-
ance procedures, HUD retained the opportunity to present 
legal and equitable defenses as an element of due process.  
Public Housing Lease and Grievance Procedures, 56 Fed. 
Reg. 6,248, 6,252 (Feb. 14, 1991).  As HUD explained, this 
requirement “signifies that the tenant must be able to raise in 
the proceeding any defense which would defeat the land-
lord’s eviction claim for possession as a matter of substantive 
law.”  Id.  When HUD promulgated the final regulations, it 
announced that, with an exception not relevant here, it had 
adopted “verbatim” the definition of due process elements 
contained in the original 1975 regulations.  Public Housing 
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Lease and Grievance Procedures, 56 Fed. Reg. 51,560, 
51,573 (Oct. 11, 1991). 
When HUD attempted to limit tenants’ grievance rights 
and, in establishing criteria for finding that state judicial evic-
tion procedures satisfy due process, sought to eliminate the 
requirement that tenants have the right to present legal and 
equitable defenses, Congress stepped in and asked HUD to 
reconsider.  Petitioners suggest that, because there is no ex-
press language in the statute creating an innocent-tenant de-
fense, the Court should conclude that none exists.  HUD 
Brief 19, OHA Brief 29.  In light of HUD’s previous attempt 
to eliminate tenants’ defenses and Congress’ intercession, 
Petitioners reverse the burden.  The Court should not con-
strue section 1437d(l)(6) as eliminating a tenant’s defense to 
eviction absent clear statutory language expressly doing so. 
B.  Interpreting section 1437d(l)(6) as precluding an 
innocent-tenant defense is unreasonable in light of 
the prohibition in section 1437d(l)(2) of lease pro-
visions that contain unreasonable terms and condi-
tions 
In considering whether HUD’s preclusion of an innocent-
tenant defense squares with congressional intent, the Ninth 
Circuit construed section 1437d(l)(6) in light of section 
1437d(l)(2), which requires PHAs to use leases that do not 
contain unreasonable terms and conditions. Appendix to Peti-
tion for Writ of Certiorari in No. 00-1770 (Pet. App.) 13a–
14a. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the eviction of inno-
cent tenants would not further the policy objectives HUD 
identified and would lead to irrational results.  For that rea-
son, the court decided that a lease provision that prohibited 
an innocent tenant defense would be unreasonable.  Pet. App. 
14a–15a.  Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded, interpreting 
section 1437d(l)(6) to prohibit an innocent-tenant defense 
would be to construe the section as requiring PHAs to use 
leases that contain an unreasonable term, in conflict with the 
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prohibition against such terms in section 1437d(l)(2).  Id.  In 
order to read the sections harmoniously, the court construed 
section 1437d(l)(6) as permitting an innocent-tenant defense.  
Id. 
HUD argues that the Ninth Circuit erred in interpreting 
section 1437d(l)(6) in light of section 1437d(l)(2)’s prohibi-
tion against unreasonable lease terms or conditions.  HUD 
Brief 15 (“Congress’s decision in Section 1437d(l)(6) to re-
quire inclusion of a lease term authorizing eviction of a ten-
ant for a household member’s drug-related criminal activity 
necessarily shows that Congress decided that such a term is 
not unreasonable . . . .”).  But HUD begs the question, for it 
assumes what is to be proven, namely, whether section 
1437d(l)(6) precludes an innocent-tenant defense. 
The Ninth Circuit’s interpretive methodology is sound.  
This Court has only recently explained that  
[i]t is a fundamental canon of statutory construc-
tion that the words of a statute must be read in 
their context and with a view to their place in the 
overall statutory scheme.  A court must therefore 
interpret the statute as a symmetrical and coher-
ent regulatory scheme and fit, if possible, all 
parts into an harmonious whole.   
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 
133 (2000) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  
If there are independent reasons for believing that the elimi-
nation of an innocent-tenant defense would be unreasonable, 
then section 1437d(l)(6) should be interpreted as requiring 
the recognition of, or at least not precluding, that defense. 
There are, indeed, reasons for believing that precluding an 
innocent-tenant defense would be unreasonable.  First, 
HUD’s interpretation of section 1437d(l)(6) undermines the 
central policy goal it purports to further.  As HUD recog-
nizes, Congress enacted section 1437d(l)(6) as a means to 
combat the use and sale of illegal drugs in public housing and 
the violence and other criminal behavior associated with the 
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drug problem. HUD Brief 3–4 (quoting policy provisions of 
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690,  
§ 5122, 102 Stat. 4181, 4301).  HUD argues that the imposi-
tion of strict liability on public housing tenants creates “the 
maximum incentive [for tenants] to find out whether house-
hold members or guests are engaging in drug-related criminal 
activity, to warn them of the serious consequences of their 
activity, and to take whatever other steps are necessary to 
protect the security of the housing project.”  HUD Brief 35; 
see also, e.g., Public Housing Lease and Grievance Proce-
dures, 56 Fed. Reg. at 51,563. 
It is a matter of common sense that, without assistance 
from the authorities, a tenant who discovers that a household 
member or guest is engaging in illegal drug-related activity 
will often not be able to prevent the individual from subse-
quently engaging in that behavior or permanently to remove 
the individual from the lease or from public housing prop-
erty.11  See Restriction on Representation in Certain Eviction 
Proceedings, 61 Fed. Reg. 63,756, 63,757 (Dec. 2, 1996) 
(“[I]nnocent family members often need legal protection 
from the drug abuser.”) (explaining final rules of the Legal 
                                                 
11 This is especially true of the large population of public housing tenants 
who are elderly or have disabilities.  In 1998, 36% of public housing ten-
ants were 62 years of age or more.  HUD, A Picture of Subsidized 
Households (1998), http://www.huduser.org/datasets/assthsg/statedata98/ 
descript.html. In 1998, over a third of public housing tenants over 62 had 
disabilities, as did one-fifth of those under 62.  Id.  Congress is acutely 
aware that elderly Americans are especially vulnerable to abuse and ex-
ploitation.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 3027(a)(15)(E), 3030d(a)(15), 3058i 
(1994) (providing for federal funding for and assistance in creating state 
elder protective services); S. Rep. No. 98-467 (1984), reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2974, 2989 (noting the “growing evidence of significant 
levels of elder abuse in this country”) (report on proposed amendments to 
the Older Americans Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3001–3058ee (1994)).  It 
is difficult to believe that Congress intended to permit the eviction of eld-
erly public housing tenants who have been exploited by household mem-
bers or guests, especially where the tenants knew nothing of the house-
hold member or guest’s illicit activity. 
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Services Corporation).  But since it would permit eviction 
whether the tenant knew or had reason to know of the illicit 
activity, HUD’s interpretation of section 1437d(l)(6) gives 
tenants a disincentive to report serious drug problems to pub-
lic housing authorities or the police.12 Because tenants will 
know that if they seek the assistance of the authorities they 
will be subject to eviction, tenants will be less likely to take 
the “other steps [that] are necessary to protect the security of 
the housing project.”  HUD Brief 35; see Nelson H. Mock, 
Note, Punishing the Innocent:  No-Fault Eviction of Public 
Housing Tenants for the Actions of Third Parties, 76 Tex. L. 
Rev. 1495, 1516–17 (1998).  HUD’s interpretation thus 
squarely conflicts with the central purpose underlying section 
1437d(l)(6).13 
                                                 
12 Indeed, HUD took the position before the Ninth Circuit that section 
1437d(l)(6) permits the eviction of tenants who did everything possible to 
prevent the illicit activity.  See, e.g., Pet. App. 22a. 
13 HUD also argues that strict-liability is required in order to give PHAs 
“bargaining power” over tenants that is necessary to get them to agree to 
bar the individual engaged in drug-related criminal activity.  HUD Brief 
36.  The idea that PHAs need strict liability in order to have bargaining 
power over tenants resembles the notion that one needs a hand grenade to 
kill a fly.  The vast majority of tenants evicted from public housing can-
not afford housing in the private market.  The median income of public 
housing tenants in 1999 was $7,631.  HUD, Recent Research Results, 
New Facts About Households Assisted by HUD’s Housing Programs 
(October 2000), http://www.huduser.org/periodicals/rrr/rrr_10_2000/1000 
_6.html.  That makes for a median monthly income of $636.  The median 
national rent for a two-bedroom apartment in 1999 was $596.  United 
States Department of Commerce, Census Bureau, American Housing 
Survey for the United States:  1999, at 226 (October 2000), available at 
http://www.huduser.org/datasets/ahs/ahs_1999.pdf.  Even if an innocent-
tenant defense is available, public housing tenants must establish the fac-
tual basis for this defense in order to avoid eviction.  This is no easy task, 
especially for the many public housing tenants who are unrepresented in 
eviction proceedings.  Moreover, courts in jurisdictions that recognize an 
innocent-tenant defense do not hesitate to evict when the tenant fails to 
convince the court that he or she reasonably lacked knowledge of the il-
licit activity that was the cause for termination.  See, e.g., Williams v. 
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Second, HUD’s interpretation of section 1437d(l)(6) as 
prohibiting an innocent-tenant defense is inconsistent with 
Congress’ endorsement of the good cause eviction require-
ments in public housing that were first developed in the 
courts and later codified by HUD and Congress.  Congress 
has itself for nearly two decades required PHAs to use leases 
that provide “that the public housing agency may not termi-
nate the tenancy except for serious or repeated violation of 
the terms or conditions of the lease or for other good cause.”  
42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(5) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
The good cause standard evolved first as a matter of case 
law.  During the McCarthy Era, a number of PHAs required 
tenants to sign loyalty oaths as a condition of their continued 
tenancy.  When tenants refused to sign, the PHAs attempted 
to evict them.  A number of courts held that the tenants’ re-
fusal was not good cause to evict, because eviction on that 
ground had no rational relationship to the purposes of public 
housing.  See, e.g., Hous. Auth. v. Cordova, 279 P.2d 215 
(Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1955); Chicago Hous. Auth. v. 
Blackman, 122 N.E.2d 522 (Ill. 1954). 
In the mid-1960s, HUD began administrative implementa-
tion of the good cause standard.  HUD first urged and then 
required PHAs to provide tenants with the reasons for the 
proposed termination of their leases.  Thorpe v. Hous. Auth. 
of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 272–63 & n.8, 275 (1969) (dis-
cussing HUD circulars).  Thereafter, it limited the sorts of 
reasons PHAs could give to terminate tenancies, forbidding 
PHAs to evict tenants except for “violation of the terms of 
the lease or other good cause.”  HUD, Consolidated Annual  
                                                                                                    
Hawai’i Hous. Auth., 690 P.2d 285 (Haw. Ct. App. 1984); Spence v. 
Gormley, 439 N.E.2d 741 (Mass. 1982); Romero v. Martinez, 721 N.Y.S. 
2d 17 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001). Thus, the simple threat of eviction—and 
the likely homelessness or substandard housing that would result—gives 
PHAs substantial bargaining power over tenants, even if they have re-
course to an innocent-tenant defense. 
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Contributions Contract, Part II, HUD Form No. 53011,  
§ 203(B) (Nov. 1969).  HUD then included the good cause 
requirement when it promulgated its first regulations on PHA 
leases and grievance procedures.  Lease and Grievance Pro-
cedures, 40 Fed. Reg. at 33,405.  In 1983, Congress incorpo-
rated the good cause requirement into the Housing Act.  
Housing and Urban Renewal Recovery Act of 1983, Pub. L. 
No. 98-181 § 204, 97 Stat. 1155, 1179 (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(5) (1994 & Supp. V 1999)). 
The good cause doctrine is built upon the principle that, 
because of the importance of the benefit, a public or federally 
subsidized housing tenant should not be deprived of his or 
her home in the absence of serious misconduct for which he 
or she is responsible.  See, e.g., Maxton Hous. Auth. v. 
McLean, 328 S.E.2d 290 (N.C. 1985); Messiah Baptist Hous. 
Dev. Fund Co. v. Rosser, 400 N.Y.S.2d 306 (N.Y.City Ct. 
1977); Moundsville Hous. Auth. v. Porter, 370 S.E.2d 341 
(W.Va. 1988).  Permitting the eviction of persons who bear 
no culpability for the illicit activity that is the basis for the 
eviction action is flatly inconsistent with this principle.  It is a 
“basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear 
some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdo-
ing.”  Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 
(1972).  Evicting innocent tenants offends that basic concept 
and so is unreasonable.  In any case, had Congress intended 
to erode what is now a cornerstone of the public housing ten-
ancy, it would not have done so by implication. 
C. The legislative history of section 1437d(l)(6) 
evinces Congress’ intent to permit tenants to assert 
an innocent-tenant defense during judicial eviction 
proceedings 
There is little legislative history directly relevant to the 
questions presented in this case.  What exists supports the 
conclusion that Congress did not intend to foreclose tenants’ 
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ability to present an innocent-tenant defense at a judicial 
eviction hearing. 
1. The predecessor to what is now section 1437d(l)(6) was 
originally enacted as part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 
1988, § 5101, 102 Stat. at 4300.  There exists no conference 
committee report for this act. 
The sole contemporaneous legislative history concerning 
the provision making drug-related criminal activity a cause 
for termination are the two sentences that appear in each of 
the Senate and House sponsor’s section-by-section descrip-
tion.  Both sponsors simply paraphrase the statutory text of 
section 1437d(l)(6).  134 Cong. Rec. 32,692, 33,148, 33,149, 
33,186 (1988).  HUD notes the Senate sponsor’s statement 
that the statutory provision “‘codifies current HUD guide-
lines granting public housing agencies authority to evict ten-
ants if they, their families, or their guests engage in drug-
related criminal activity.’”  HUD Brief 38 (quoting 134 
Cong. Rec. at 33,186) (alteration omitted).  HUD suggests 
that the regulations to which the Senate sponsor referred were 
those promulgated by HUD on August 30, 1988, id. at 38, 
and that Congress “specifically adopted the approach of the 
HUD regulations,” id. at 38–39.14 
The regulation in question required PHAs to use leases 
that provide that the tenant “[s]hall not engage in criminal 
activity in the dwelling unit or premises, and shall prevent 
                                                 
14 HUD notes the regulations promulgated on August 30, 1988 were sub-
ject to a temporary restraining order, that Congress directed HUD to treat 
the regulations as interim rather than final and to reopen notice and com-
ment, that the court that issued the restraining order thereafter preliminar-
ily enjoined implementation of the regulations, and that HUD ultimately 
withdrew the regulations.  HUD Brief at 39 n.13.  But HUD fails to men-
tion that the congressional conference committee report for the legislation 
that directed HUD to reconsider the regulations expressed serious reser-
vations about HUD’s elimination from among the “elements of due proc-
ess” the opportunity to present legal and equitable defenses—such as 
breach of the warranty of habitability—during judicial eviction hearings.  
See supra Part II.A. 
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criminal activity in the unit or premises by guests, visitors, or 
other persons under control of Household members.”  Ten-
ancy and Administrative Grievance Procedure for Public 
Housing, 53 Fed. Reg. at 33,227.  While HUD would like the 
Court to infer that the regulation, and the predecessor to sec-
tion 1437d(l)(6), unequivocally permitted the eviction of ten-
ants who did not know and had no reason to know of the 
drug-related criminal activity, this is not how HUD under-
stood its regulation in 1988.  HUD explained that under the 
lease provision required by the regulation “[t]he tenant has a 
positive duty to ‘prevent’ the prohibited activities by third 
parties. The tenant does not escape responsibility if the tenant 
and household passively condone prohibited acts. Instead, the 
tenant and household must do what is necessary to ‘prevent’ 
the prohibited acts.”  Id. at 33,229 (emphasis added). 
At the very most, HUD’s explanation of its regulation 
simply does not speak to the question of whether eviction is 
permitted under the regulation when the tenant did not know 
and had no reason to know of the prohibited activity.  How-
ever, HUD’s explanation of the purpose of the regulation—
that it is meant to prevent a tenant from escaping responsibil-
ity if he or she passively condones illicit activity—
demonstrates that in 1988 HUD believed that the regulation 
only applied to tenants who knew of the illicit activity. 
2. Amici Council of Large Public Housing Authorities et 
al. argue that the 1989 enactment and subsequent repeal of a 
statutory provision protecting the rights of tenants “not in-
volved” in drug-related activity is further evidence that, in 
enacting the predecessor to section 1437d(l)(6), Congress 
intended to prohibit the assertion of an innocent-tenant de-
fense.  Brief for Amici Council of Large Public Housing Au-
thorities et al. (CLPHA Brief) 12–14. 
As discussed above, if a PHA decides to evict a tenant for 
drug-related criminal activity, the PHA may bypass the ad-
ministrative grievance process if the PHA is located in a ju-
risdiction in which HUD finds that judicial eviction proce-
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dures satisfy the elements of due process.  See supra Part 
II.A.  The statute the CLPHA brief discusses directed HUD 
not to authorize a waiver of administrative grievance proce-
dures in cases involving eviction for drug-related criminal 
activity unless the jurisdiction seeking waiver, in addition to 
satisfying HUD’s due process standard, ensured that the evic-
tion of a household member involved in drug-related activity 
did not “‘affect the right of any other household member who 
is not involved in such activity to continue tenancy.’”  
CLPHA Brief 13 n.23 (quoting Dire Emergency Supplemen-
tal Appropriations and Transfers, Urgent Supplementals, and 
Correcting Enrollment Errors Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-
45, § 404(b), 103 Stat. 97, 128). 
The CLPHA brief suggests that the subsequent repeal of 
this provision evinces Congress’ intent to preclude an inno-
cent-tenant defense.15  However, as the District Court in this 
case concluded, the statutory provision that was repealed 
simply does not speak to the issue central to this case:   
The temporary extra “protection” [provided by 
the statute] applied to household members who 
were not personally involved in the criminal ac-
tivity, but who may have had knowledge or a rea-
son to know of the drug-related criminal activity.  
The statute says nothing about tenants who did 
not know, and had no reason to know, of the 
criminal activity. 
Pet. App. 150a. 
3. The only piece of legislative history that speaks directly 
to the questions presented is a report from the Senate Com-
mittee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs that accom-
                                                 
15 Section 404 of the Supplemental Appropriations Act was repealed by 
the Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Develop-
ment, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 
101-144, 103 Stat. 839, 853. 
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panied 1990 legislation amending section 1437d(l)(6).16  In 
that report, the committee stated that it  
anticipates that each case will be judged on its 
individual merits and will require the wise exer-
cise of humane judgment by the PHA and the 
eviction court. For example, eviction would not 
be the appropriate course if the tenant had no 
knowledge of the criminal activities of his/her 
guests or had taken reasonable steps under the 
circumstances to prevent the activity. 
S. Rep. No. 101-316 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5763, 5941; see also id., reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
5889 (“[T]he Committee assumes that if the tenant had no 
knowledge of the criminal activity or took reasonable steps to 
prevent it, then good cause to evict the innocent family mem-
bers would not exi[s]t.” (discussing similar provision for the 
Section 8 program)).17 
HUD describes this passage as “merely recogniz[ing] that 
PHAs . . . have discretion in deciding whether, if at all, to 
evict tenants who have violated the Section 1437d(l)(6) lease 
provision, and urg[ing] the importance of a wise use of that 
discretion.”  HUD Brief 43.  But HUD’s characterization is 
only half the story.  The committee did not merely exhort 
PHAs to use their wise discretion.  It also stated that the 
question whether to evict “require[s] the wise exercise of 
humane judgment by the PHA and the eviction court,” and 
that eviction courts should exercise their discretion to prevent 
                                                 
16 The legislation was the Cranston-Gonzales National Affordable Hous-
ing Act, Pub. L. No. 101-625, 104 Stat. 4185 (1990). 
17 HUD attempts to undermine the relevance of the committee report by 
arguing that the report discussed a Senate bill different from the one that 
was enacted.  HUD Brief 43.  But the ways in which the Senate bill dif-
fered from the final legislation, documented by HUD in its brief, are 
wholly irrelevant to the question of Congress’ intent concerning an inno-
cent-tenant defense because the changes relate only to the scope of the 
cause for termination.  See id. at 43. 
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the eviction of innocent tenants.  S. Rep. No. 101-316, re-
printed in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5941 (emphasis added).  If 
the committee did not intend for judges to consider tenants’ 
claims of reasonable lack of knowledge, then it would make 
no sense for it to state that eviction courts should exercise 
“humane judgment.”  This is because, if tenants do not have 
available an innocent-tenant defense, then the only thing for 
an eviction court to decide is whether there is a cause for 
eviction (e.g., whether the drug-related activity occurred); in 
that event, the court would have no occasion to exercise its 
“humane judgment.”18 
The only legislative history that bears directly on the issue 
before the Court demonstrates that Congress intended to 
permit tenants to assert innocence as a defense to eviction 
under the required lease provision and that HUD’s contrary 
interpretation is unreasonable. 
                                                 
18 Indeed, this is HUD’s misguided view of the role of eviction courts. 
Screening and Eviction for Drug Abuse and Other Criminal Activity, 66 
Fed. Reg. 28776, 28782 (May 24, 2001) (“The statute does not authorize 
courts to exercise this same type of discretion. Courts determine whether 
a violation of the lease has occurred and whether the lease provides that 
such a violation is grounds for eviction of the persons whom the PHA 
seeks to evict.”).  HUD’s current interpretation is flatly inconsistent with 
the committee’s statement that eviction courts will use their discretion in 
deciding these public housing eviction cases.  Note that this is not how 
HUD previously viewed the role of the eviction court.  In its notice to 
public housing directors explaining President Clinton’s “One Strike and 
You’re Out” policy, HUD informed public housing agencies that if they 
“do seek eviction” of household members not directly involved with the 
drug-related activity, “PHAs should be prepared to persuade a court that 
eviction is justified.”  HUD, Office of Public and Indian Housing, “One 
Strike and You’re Out” Screening and Eviction Guidelines for Public 
Housing Authorities, Notice PIH 96-16 (HA), at 8 (April 12, 1996). 
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D. Since Congress enacted section 1437d(l)(6) against 
a background of state landlord-tenant law in 
which there exist affirmative defenses to causes for 
termination, had Congress intended to eliminate 
such defenses, it would have said so 
The Court has explained that where a statute fails to speak 
to an issue, deference to agency regulations is appropriate 
under Chevron when the issue involved requires the applica-
tion of the statute’s general policies to specific circum-
stances.  In that case, “the agency must use its discretion to 
determine how best to implement the policy in those cases 
not covered by the statute's specific terms.”  United States v. 
Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380, 393 (1999).  However, 
this case does not involve a situation in which Congress 
could not “anticipate all circumstances in which a general 
policy must be given specific effect.”  Id. at 392. 
In establishing federally-assisted public housing, Congress 
created a property interest that is an amalgam of federal and 
state law.  As HUD has explained, 
the procedural and substantive law affecting a 
tenancy in the public housing program is com-
pounded of elements established by both Federal 
and State law.  
State laws are binding without incorporation in 
a Federal rule, or in the Federally-required lease 
requirements. State tenant protections may be en-
forced through the State courts or other proce-
dures available under State law, without any need 
to create a Federal right to State law protections. 
Tenancy and Administrative Grievance Procedure for Public 
Housing, 53 Fed. Reg. at 33,257; see also Tenancy and Ad-
ministrative Grievance Procedure for Public Housing, 56 
Fed. Reg. at 51,565 (“The Federal law defines minimum pro-
tections for the Federally assisted public housing tenant, but 
does not preempt additional protections or rights provided by 
the State which do not violate the Federal law.”).  When en-
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acting and amending section 1437d(l)(6), Congress was well 
aware of the hybrid nature of the public housing leasehold 
interest.  More specifically, it was aware that public housing 
tenants could and routinely do assert state-law defenses to 
eviction from public housing.  See e.g., supra notes 4, 14. 
The distinction between causes for termination of tenancy 
and possible defenses to such causes is well established in 
landlord-tenant law.  See supra Part I.  Indeed, various states 
have recognized an affirmative innocent-tenant defense to 
for-cause evictions.  See supra note 9.  Congress specifically 
chose to require PHAs to use leases that create a specified 
cause for termination.  Had Congress intended to eliminate a 
central element of the public housing tenancy, one would 
have expected Congress to have stated so explicitly.19  See 
Stephen G. Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and 
Policy, 38 Admin. L. Rev. 363, 370 (1986) (“A court may . . . 
ask whether the legal question is an important one. Congress 
                                                 
19 HUD itself recognized that Congress intended to leave in place any 
state-law defenses to eviction.  In announced proposed regulations im-
plementing the 1990 amendments to the predecessor to section 
1437d(l)(6), HUD stated that the proposed regulations would have no 
federalism implications under Executive Order No. 12,612.  Public 
Housing Lease and Grievance Procedures, 56 Fed. Reg. at 51,575; see 
also Exec. Order No. 12,612, 52 Fed. Reg. 41685, § 4(a) (October 26, 
1987) (“Executive departments and agencies shall construe, in regulations 
and otherwise, a Federal statute to preempt State law only when the 
statute contains an express preemption provision or there is some other 
firm and palpable evidence compelling the conclusion that the Congress 
intended preemption of State law, or when the exercise of State authority 
directly conflicts with the exercise of Federal authority under the Federal 
statute.”), revoked by Exec. Order No. 13,083, 63 Fed. Reg. 27,615 (May 
14, 1998).  Similarly, in promulgating its most recent regulations 
implementing section 1437d(l)(6), HUD expressly stated that the 
regulations do not preempt state law within the meaning of Executive 
Order No. 13,132.  Screening and Eviction for Drug Abuse and Other 
Criminal Activity, 66 Fed. Reg. at 28,791; see also Exec. Order No. 
13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255, § 4(a) (Aug. 14, 1999) (containing language 
substantially similar to Exec. Order No. 12,612 § 4(a)). 
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is more likely to have focused upon, and answered, major 
questions, while leaving interstitial matters to answer them-
selves in the course of the statute's daily administration.”); cf. 
42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(7) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (requiring 
that PHAs use leases providing tenants the right to examine 
“documents, records, or regulations” directly related to the 
PHA’s decision to evict, “notwithstanding any State law” to 
the contrary). 
This is not a case in which Congress expected HUD to 
“fill in the statutory gaps.”  Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 
150.  In light of the hybrid nature of public housing tenan-
cies, Congress’ silence on the viability of affirmative de-
fenses to eviction under the lease provision mandated by sec-
tion 1437d(l)(6) is an indication of its intent to permit tenants 
to continue to avail themselves of all defenses otherwise 
available to them as a matter of substantive law, including 
that of innocence. 
CONCLUSION 
The two questions on which the Court granted certiorari 
differ in a slight but important respect.  The question in No. 
00-1770 is whether “the lease clause provided for in 42 
U.S.C. [§] 1437d(l)(6) (Sup. V 1999) is violated by drug-
related criminal activity of household members, regardless of 
whether it can be shown that the tenant knew, or had reason 
to know, of the drug-related activity.” HUD Brief I (emphasis 
added).  The question in No. 00-1781 is whether “42 U.S.C. 
§ 1437d(l)(6) permits termination of a tenancy if a tenant did 
not know, or have reason to know, that a household member 
or guest engaged in drug-related criminal activity.”  OHA 
Brief i (emphasis added). 
Amici have argued that while section 1437d(l)(6) requires 
the use of leases that create a cause for termination when a 
household member engages in drug-related criminal activity, 
the existence of this cause is fully consistent with the exis-
tence of an affirmative innocent-tenant defense to eviction.  
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For this reason, Amici urge the Court to answer the question 
in No. 00-1770 “Yes, but . . . .”  Yes, the lease clause is vio-
lated by the drug-related criminal activity of a tenant’s 
household members, regardless of the tenant’s knowledge, 
but the tenant may assert an innocent-tenant defense at a ju-
dicial eviction hearing.  For the same reason, Amici urge the 
Court to answer the question in No. 00-1781 “No,” because 
section 1437d(l)(6) permits public housing tenants to assert 
reasonable lack of knowledge as a defense in a judicial evic-
tion proceeding. 
Because the judgment of the Court of Appeals is consis-
tent with these answers, it should be affirmed. 
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